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PHOEBE'S LAMENT
James . White*
Assume a bright hypothetical social scientist - call her Phoebe -
who is completely ignorant of legal research as it is practiced in to-
day's law schools. Phoebe might speculate about legal research as
follows. First, she would note that the law schools are joined with and
are the exclusive source of the practitioners of a profession. Second,
she would note that commercial and legal actors rub up against and
are influenced by the law in countless ways every day. Third, she
might remark that this interaction occurs practically on the doorsteps
of our law schools. Unlike anthropologists, who may have to travel to
New Guinea to observe their subjects' behavior, or psychologists, who
must devise clever experiments to observe their subjects' hidden mo-
tives and instincts, the interaction of law with the commercial life of
various actors is practically lying in the street to be picked up by any
passerby. And finally, she might note that discreet bodies - state and
federal legislatures - pass new laws every year in response to appar-
ent needs of commercial actors or in response to apparent difficulties
with existing law.
Making these observations, Phoebe might then predict that a large
share of legal research would consist of the collection of data about
the interaction of law and life and the statistical analysis of those data
to determine what is happening, how the law influences behavior in
wise or unwise ways, and what new laws should be enacted and in
what form. She might further speculate that much of this research
would be directed to and have a large influence on state, federal, and
elite (ALI and NCCUSL) legislatures.' Moreover, she could support
her prediction by noting that distinguished lawyers such as Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Derek Bok, Peter Schuck, and Michael Heise have
long exhorted law professors to undertake such work, in some cases
even predicting that empirical research would ultimately become the
dominant form of legal scholarship
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1956,
Amherst College; J.D. 1962, University of Michigan. -Ed. I thank Robert J. Waldner '00
for research and my colleague Phoebe Ellsworth, emphatically not the hypothetical Phoebe,
for her insight and comments.
1. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595,629 (1995).
2. See [Justice] Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication
of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8,1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 467 (1897), reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLEcrED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
187 (1920) ("For the rational study of the law.., the man of the future is the man of statis-
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Of course, her speculation would be wrong - almost completely
wrong. Law professors do limited empirical work and almost none of
that work is the statistical analysis of large bodies of data.' Some of
this empirical work is directed at the legislatures and put before them,
but the legislatures seem to consume little of it.4 So Phoebe's specula-
tion would be confounded. But why is that so, why does the world not
conform to this plausible speculation?
The question why law professors do not do more elaborate empiri-
cal work5 has been carefully addressed by Peter Schuck 6 and Michael
Heise.7 Their explanations are persuasive, and if any of you law pro-
fessors would like to know why you are unlikely ever to undertake a
large empirical study, notwithstanding your demonstrated interest in
empirical work, you can find out by reading their work. So I pass this
first question - why law professors do not do more big empirical re-
search - and I ask you to think with me about the second question -
why the legislatures seem not to rely on empirical work. Of course, if
you share my conclusions about the legislatures' behavior and about
the reasons for that behavior, it may influence your decision to move
on to larger empirical studies or to backslide into conventional law
professor research. I believe that empirical work has had a most lim-
ited impact on commercial legislation and that strong reasons will
keep it so.
tics and the master of economics."); Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and
Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 570, 581-82 (1983); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being
Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807 (1999); Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do
More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUc. 323 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 2, at 810-12; Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholar-
ship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 347, 362 tbl.1 (1995) (noting that a large majority of the small group of law professors
surveyed feel that there is not enough empirical research in legal scholarship); Schuck, supra
note 2, at 323-24.
4. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating Bank-
ruptcy Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 195, 195 ("[W]e must begin with
the striking fact that empirical research has played almost no role in the development of
bankruptcy policy."). Also, in an e-mail dated February 18,2000, John McCabe, Legislative
Director of NCCUSL, indicated that he could not recall any instances where NCCUSL had
looked at an empirical study prior to commencing work on an act. (E-mail on file with
author).
5. This is not to say that the types of empirical work more commonly done by law pro-
fessors are without value. Phoebe, our hypothetical social scientist, might describe the re-
search method of using case studies in the following way:
Methods are not good or bad per se, and social scientists would not reject case studies out of
hand. They are good for the initial exploratory stages, okay for checking the real world gen-
eralizability of lab experiment results. They are not good for testing hypotheses definitively
or for establishing that a relationship is generally true, and that is what you would want as a
basis for changing law or precedent.
6. See Schuck, supra note 2.
7. See Heise, supra note 2.
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That the legislative process has a powerful immunity to empirical
work is ironic but nearly indisputable. Every single day of the year,
the state or federal legislatures, not to mention the elite legislatures
(ALI, NCCUSL), make decisions that could be informed and im-
proved with greater knowledge of prevailing practices and motives of
the relevant parties. Yet, the proudest example of legislation in-
formed by empirical research is the small loan laws that were appar-
ently adopted as a direct result of the 1907 study in New York by the
Russell Sage Foundation.8 That we must reach to 1907 for the best
example is discouraging.
That there are few other acknowledged examples says more. In
revising the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Congress appointed a commis-
sion that did considerable empirical work and prepared a draft of the
statute that Congress eventually passed.' How much of that statute
eventually was influenced by the studies is not clear, but no one has
claimed that it had a large impact. 0 The Conard study of auto acci-
dents in Michigan" may have influenced the adoption and form of no
fault laws in some states, but that, too, is subject to dispute. Of
course, one might argue that the paucity of studies insures paucity of
influence, but that argument is not persuasive. Even though empirical
studies have been only a small part of all law professors' work, in the
aggregate, that work, particularly when combined with the work of
economists and other nonlawyers, is substantial, yet there is little evi-
dence that this work has significantly influenced legislatures. 3
Despite the fact that each purports to be interested only in "im-
proving the law," even the ALI and the National Conference seem
8. See DAVID J. GALLERT ET AL., SMALL LOAN LEGISLATION: A HISTORY OF THE
REGULATION OF THE BUSINESS OF LENDING SMALL SUMS 54-60 (1932).
9. See COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-
137, pt. 1, pt. 1 corrected, pt. 2 (1973).
10. See Sullivan et al., supra note 4, at 195 n.2; Discussion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1977, at 123, 129 (suggesting that the opinions of the commission were formed prior
to the receipt of empirical data).
11. ALBERT F. CONARD FT AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS:
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964).
12. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Foreword, Symposium on the American
Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 213, 214 (1993) (suggesting that the adoption of the no-fault regime was as
much the result of the work of Robert Keeton and Jeffery O'Conell as it was of the Conard
study).
13. See Discussion, supra note 10, at 128-29 (describing the legislative process, Phil
Schuchman said: "One gets very little time and can't mount studies, because they take too
long and the data are messy. Congress wants answers, and its notion of empirical study is to
poll a group of experts. If it wants to find whether and how to change the law, it asks a hun-
dred lawyers.").
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never to have used empirical studies. 4 As the Reporter for the revi-
sion of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a member of the
drafting committee to revise Article 1, and a member of another
committee for Articles 2 and 2A, I have not once seen or heard the ci-
tation of an empirical study to support a particular proposition. And
that is not because the drafters do not make judgements about the
merits of proposals based on their beliefs about the underlying prac-
tices and disputes. For example, we revised Article 5 to make it more
difficult for an applicant to enjoin the honoring of a letter of credit.
We did that because we believed that letters of credit were threatened
more by those who might falsely allege fraudulent acts by beneficiaries
than by those beneficiaries who might present fraudulent documents
to secure payment. 5 The judgement about that threat was based on a
nonsystematic reading of the reported cases (hardly the best source)
and on purely anecdotal evidence out of the mouths of bankers and
lawyers who came to the drafting table and made assertions about
practice.
So why are empirical studies so sparse and so uninfluential? The
first reason is timing. Conventional legislatures almost always act in
response to the political goals of their members or constituents.
Rarely will legislatures be willing to wait one, much less three or four,
years for a study. If any formal study will take two, or even three or
four years from start to finish, the person doing the study needs more
warning than a legislature can give. Even the ALI and NCCUSL are
not normally willing to wait three or four years after they have de-
cided to proceed with a topic. 6
The second reason why empirical studies are so sparse and unin-
fluential is the problem of commitment to a particular value or ideol-
ogy.17 Any question worth studying must have at least two plausible
answers; in many cases one of those answers will be unacceptable to
the legislative sponsor who is already committed to one outcome irre-
spective of the facts. To put the point more generously, even the most
powerful empirical study might not change the mind of a legislative
participant if that person's commitment to a particular value is strong
enough.
14. See E-mail from John McCabe, Legislative Director, NCCUSL, supra note 4 ("I do
not know of any empirical studies that have ever been done as part of an R & D effort be-
fore work on an act has commenced."). One exception to this general proposition that has
come to my attention is an early study by Phoebe Eilsworth, which was adopted by the ALI
in its Model Code on the subject. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Robert J. Levy, Legislative Reform
of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in Formulating Le-
gal Policies, 4 L. & SOC'Y REV. 167 (1969).
15. Compare U.C.C. § 5-109 (1995) with U.C.C. § 5-114 (1992) (making it more difficult
to obtain injunctions against honor).
16. See Discussion, supra note 10, at 128-29.
17. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 332.
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Consider Professor Michelle White's study of exemptions in bank-
ruptcy and her analysis of the effect of exemptions on debtors' be-
havior.18 She suggests that high exemptions encourage individual
debtors to file and that the expansive exemptions available in places
like Texas and Florida predominantly benefit comparatively affluent
debtors. Those findings make no impact on one who believes that a
much-expanded Chapter 7 would be desirable, nor on one who be-
lieves that even relatively affluent persons should keep their houses -
however large - from all but their mortgagees. Surely many legisla-
tive disputes, that appear to concern the relevant facts, are in truth
ideological disputes that cannot be resolved by knowing more facts.
Witness the debates in Congress in 1998 and 1999 over proposals
to make Chapter 13 (consumer payment plans) mandatory for some
debtors. Creditors' advocates argued that the data called for a restric-
tion on Chapter 7 filings while debtors' advocates argued that the
same data demanded no change in the law.' 9 In reality, this was an
ideological dispute about which facts had little to say. What would
even the most elegant and persuasive empirical study add to the public
debates over abortion? I doubt that such a study would move even
one pro-life advocate into the pro-choice camp, or vice versa, so strong
is their ideology.
A third reason for the lack of influence in the legislatures is the
skepticism of the players. I would expect partisan political actors to be
instinctively skeptical of any researcher's impartiality. Since large-
scale studies are expensive and there is a limited amount of disinter-
ested money available, this can be a monumental problem. Who will
believe a study - even by researchers purer than Caesar's wife - if it
is funded by the tobacco industry, NOW, or General Motors? Every
one of us is rightly skeptical of studies that relate to a sponsor's eco-
nomic or political interests, yet that is where most of the money is.
When that appropriate skepticism is magnified by the animosity and
suspicion always present between partisan politicians in a legislature,
and when that magnified skepticism is yet again enlarged by adding
the layman's natural skepticism of counterintuitive conclusions that
are justified only by statistical analysis, how could an honest empiricist
ever hope to persuade a legislature?
18. See Michelle J. White, Why it Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the
Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 685 (1998).
19. Compare, e.g., Prepared Testimony of Ms. Beth Climo, Group Director for Financial
Industry Affairs, American Bankers Association, Hearing on Bankruptcy Reform and Finan-
cial Services Issues, Senate Banking Comm., 1999 WL 170244 (Mar. 25, 1999) with Prepared
Testimony of Mr. Gary Klein, Staff Attorney for National Consumer Law Center, Hearing on
Bankruptcy Reform and Financial Services Issues, Senate Banking Comm., 1999 WL
8086173 (Mar. 25,1999).
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A fourth, related reason arises from legislators' unfamiliarity with
empirical work. Because they are not familiar with conventional sta-
tistical analysis and because they are ignorant of common but subtle
errors that can occur even in well-intended work,20 legislators are
mostly incapable of distinguishing between good and bad work, be-
tween studies that should be dismissed or doubted and those that
should be accepted and believed.
Fifth, empirical findings are often indeterminate. It would be quite
possible to do a competent study of those who have filed for bank-
ruptcy and of those who are likely candidates for filing and yet find no
help on the question whether an expanded Chapter 13 would ulti-
mately reduce bankruptcies or return larger payments to creditors
than the current system does. The study might fail because the wrong
people were examined, because the wrong questions were asked, or
because the study could not anticipate the actions of debtors and
creditors in response to new law.
A sixth reason is that even a first-rate study may have difficulty in
the face of competing anecdotes.21 Even a careful, dispassionate study,
which showed the provision of drugs to be successful and optimal un-
der current Medicare and Medicaid practices, could not compete With
a single live witness who might appear before a congressional commit-
tee to report how her child died in her arms for the want of a particu-
lar drug. This phenomenon - that the lesson of a single vivid exam-
ple will outweigh the far more reliable lesson of the abstract data from
multiple respondents - is well known in the psychology literature?'
Where there are two sides in a legislative dispute, one side will often
be able to confront any damaging empirical study with vivid counter-
examples.
The experience recounted above and the reasons behind that expe-
rience tell me that persons who assume that significant legislative
benefits will flow from more empirical legal research are at least too
facile and, possibly, wrong. This failure to influence the legislative
process does not arise primarily from defects in the empirical work; it
is like an autoimmune reaction of the legislative body to a beneficial
treatment. The reaction arises partly from characteristics of the
problems that confront the legislatures (value-laden), partly from the
structural qualities of legislatures (composed of partisan opponents
20. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 45-66 (1985)
(discussing common threats to validity of social science research, such as non-representative
subjects, lack of geographical diversity, and research performed across too great a time pe-
riod).
21. See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 55-59 (1980) (explaining why vivid, anecdotal case-
studies have a stronger effect on inferences than statistical data that is actually more proba-
tive on the issue in question).
22. See id.
2778 [Vol. 98:2773
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who have relatively short timelines), and partly from the limits inher-
ent in empirical research (time needed; difficulty in competing with
vivid counterexamples or strong beliefs).
So I do not mean to discourage you from your current endeavors
- case studies - nor from going on to more elaborate empirical
work. I say only that you should not do it with the expectation that
the legislatures, even the elite ones, will attend to your findings. And
when social scientists criticize your work as "anecdotal" and insuffi-
cient to support legislation, you can at least respond that more grand
and expensive work would have no greater impact. Of course, it is
possible that I am only restating every law professor's lament - that
the legislatures pay too little attention to us whether we write about
theory, doctrine, or life.
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